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Big data and the morality of inclusion 
 




In this chapter, we analyze questions pertaining to the use of predictive models based on big data 
from the point of view of Allen Buchanan’s ‘morality of inclusion” (Buchanan 1996; Buchanan, Cole, 
and Keohane 2011). Here we discuss to potential ethical risks of big data that are normally not 
discussed in the literature. The prevailing themes in the big data ethics literature are privacy, 
discrimination, and threats to autonomy, in particular autonomy as informational self-
determination (Floridi 2012; Barocas and Nissenbaum 2014; Mittelstadt and Floridi 2015; Barocas 
and Selbst 2016; Christen et al. 2016; Vayena and Blasimme 2017). Here we show that beyond these 
concerns, big data also raise distinct issues that can be properly analyzed by using Buchanan’s 
conceptual framework of the morality of inclusion. We illustrate ethical threats of big data for the 
morality of inclusion with two example of big data applications, one taken from the insurance 
domain and the other from the employment domain.  
 
1. The morality of inclusion 
 
One way to introduce the concept of the morality of inclusion is by discussing the idea of the social 
construction of disability (Oliver 1990; Amundson and Tresky 2008). Buchanan recognizes that 
disability results from the interaction of natural components (impairments in biological function) 
and social components (the context in which the function in question results inadequate). Thus, 
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whether any given trait T counts as a disability in a society S depends on features of that society: “it 
is only those inabilities that interfere with the performance of socially significant tasks (in one's 
social environment, relative to one's reference group) that count as disabilities” (Buchanan 1996, 
38). For example, dyslexia, a biological dysfunction, is not a disability in a society that does not rely 
on written communication. Advanced numerical and verbal skills, such as they are necessary in 
technically sophisticated societies, imply the exclusion of mildly cognitively impaired individuals 
from many forms of interaction. Notice that not all disabilities fall in these categories. We do not 
refer to severe disabilities that involve extreme impairments in all main areas of development 
(psychomotor, emotional, communicative, social, and cognitive) and in a broad range of imaginable 
social contexts. Here, sophisticated medical and psychosocial support is a precondition to allow 
even for a basic level of social participation. But it has been argued that this framework can explain 
why even serious physiological impairments like blindness and deafness are to a significant extent 
disabling only by virtue of the way the social environment is constructed (Oliver 1990; Amundson 
and Tresky 2008; for a critique see Barclay 2011).  
More generally, adopting specific institutions and technologies (and institutions affecting 
the adoption of specific technology) determines the kind of persons who can contribute to society 
by cooperating with others and who cannot. One example of this is provided by the largely 
theoretical discussion about the possibility of enhancing individuals beyond normal function 
through genetic engineering.1 From Buchanan and others’ points of view, normally functioning 
citizens (relative to current standards) living in an imagined future society in which most people will 
be genetically enhanced (compared to current levels) will be the ‘new disabled’. This will happen if 
                                                        
1 This domain of technology that has seen breakthrough advances in recent time with the CRISPR-CAS 9 technique 
(Harris 1998, 2007; Buchanan et al. 2000; Ledford 2015). More recently there have been news in the press concerning 
the fact that the first genetically enhanced humans (individuals with CRISPR-engineered AIDS resistance) may have 
allegedly already been created, but no official confirmation of this alleged breakthrough could be produced (Ryan 
n.d.). 
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citizens who are merely ‘normal’ (by current standards) will be excluded from forms of cooperation 
requiring capacities that count as ‘enhanced’, relative to the current normality standard.2  
Buchanan uses the expression “dominant cooperative scheme” (Buchanan 1996, 40) to refer 
to the assemblage of institutional and technical factors that emerge from the cumulative interaction 
of several individuals over time and that determine who is more likely to be included in social 
cooperation. Our choices leading to one or a possibly different dominant cooperative scheme 
matter morally because: 
 
“Each individual also has an important interest in having access to a dominant cooperative 
scheme that is the most productive and rewarding form of interaction in which he or she 
can participate effectively” (Buchanan 1996, 42). 
 
Buchanan denies that justice requires in every single instance the adoption of the most inclusive 
feasible dominant cooperative scheme. There are trade-offs between the features making a 
cooperative scheme more inclusive and other features resulting in greater human well-being. Thus, 
making a cooperative scheme inclusive to the extreme may be too costly for society. For example, 
our current cooperative scheme could more easily include the mildly cognitively disabled, by relying 
on more primitive productive arrangements (e.g., those not requiring advanced numerical and 
verbal skills). A valid moral argument against such cooperative scheme however is that it would 
plausibly not be able to produce the amount of resources that are needed to meet many important 
citizens’ needs (including the need for education and health care also for mildly cognitively disabled 
persons). However, one can find a balance between reasons to make social cooperation more 
                                                        
2 This view is entailed by, but does not entail, Daniels’ that if normal functioning is defined as statistically normal 
functioning relative to one’s contemporaries, individuals that are normal by current standard who qualify as having 
health needs. For objections against this view see (Loi 2013). 
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inclusive and reasons to promote other desirable features of social cooperation, which may pull in 
opposite directions. This requires partially adjusting features of social cooperation, at least locally, 
and to a given degree, assuming reasonable trade-offs.  
Making reasonable adjustments to the dominant (institutional) scheme of cooperation even 
though it has some costs is morally analogous to adjusting the physical infrastructure of cooperation 
that decent societies consider ethically mandatory. This moral requirement appears to be widely 
socially supported. Our society already accepts the principle that some adjustments in the physical 
infrastructure of cooperation are ethically mandatory in that reasonable.  For example, most people 
agree that society ought to provide for the special needs of disabled persons by building wheelchair 
ramps and that companies should make reasonable efforts to favor the inclusion of disabled 
individuals. These are necessary to ensure an otherwise unachievable inclusion of persons with 
disabilities in forms of social cooperation, deemed important for their flourishing as human 
individuals (Nussbaum 2006). There is also growing acceptance for the idea that companies or tax-
payers (not disabled persons themselves) should subsidize the diffusion of technologies that enable 
workers with mild visual impairments to be better integrated in the work place (e.g. technologies 
to facilitate reading from computers) (Radu n.d.).  
According to the morality of inclusion, unequal access to technological innovations may raise 
morality of inclusion problems, similar to the exclusion of the mildly disabled from social 
cooperation. The exclusion of the mildly disabled, just as the exclusion of the people lacking access 
to technology, is a distinct harm from severe deprivation and political domination (Buchanan, Cole, 
and Keohane 2011). 
As we shall briefly show in what follows, exclusion from the dominant cooperative 
framework may also result from technologies that do not enhance traits above normality. Other 
technologies may contribute to raise the threshold of normal ability for cooperation, in a given 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327281 
society. The analogy between choosing a more inclusive cooperation scheme and modifying the 
physical structure of cooperation is only partial, because society does not have the same amount of 
control on the ways in which people cooperate. Buchanan points out that although these are not 
entirely subject to human deliberate social choice, there might be moments “at certain critical 
junctures in human history” (Buchanan 1996, p. 41) where it may be able to exercise some degree 
of choice. Arguably, the diffusion of predictive models based on a large variety and volume of 
diverse data produced at considerable speed (“The Four V’s of Big Data” n.d.) represents such a 
critical juncture. Thus, in what follows we consider the social implications of the diffusion of 
predictive models based on big data from the point of view of the morality of inclusion. 
We try to explain why we consider the diffusion of predictive models based on big data a 
critical juncture that is relevant to the morality of inclusion, in the following two sections. To do so, 
we focus on applications of predictive models based on big data in two different domains: insurance 
and human resources.  
 
 
2. Big data in insurance 
 
Big data can be used in the insurance domain in many different ways.  A recent report written by 
the Geneva Association (an international think tank bringing together experts from some of the 
world’s wealthiest and most powerful insurance companies) states that:  
 
New sources of digital data, for example in online media and the Internet of 
Things, reveal information about behaviours, habits and lifestyles that allows us to 
assess individual risks much better than before. In many instances, better data 
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makes it possible to better align premiums and risks and to reduce the overall cost 
of insurance. […]  But arguably the greatest societal benefits come from the 
potential to reduce risks through better data and new digital technologies. […] By 
providing risk insights to policyholders, such ‘digital monitoring’ encourages 
behavioural change to reduce risks. Moreover, new data sources allow for the 
implementation of advanced risk management systems that use predictive 
analytics as a basis for early intervention and risk prevention. Ultimately, these 
technologies allow the role of insurance to evolve from pure risk protection 
towards predicting and preventing risks (Keller 2018, 6). 
 
How does then a specific problem emerge from the point of view of the morality of inclusion 
(henceforth MoI) in the context of insurance? At a fairly abstract level, big data is problematic for 
MoI if the use of big data in insurance can negatively affect the ability of specific citizens to 
participate to social cooperation.  This can happen if the following three conditions are satisfied: 
 
1. There exist insurance products that are necessary for social inclusion. 
2. The ‘actuarially fair’ premiums of those products are too high for some clients, making them 
uninsurable. 
3. Society implicitly relies on private insurance companies to provide goods and services that 
are essential for social inclusion and does not foresee any social compensation mechanism 
for high costs clients. 
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We will present two hypothetical scenarios. In the first one, concerning physicians and surgeons, 
social exclusion seems morally objectionable also because of the poor accuracy of the predictions 
from which it ensues. In the second scenario, concerning car drivers, it is arguably morally 
objectionable in spite of being based (in the imagined case) on very accurate predictions.   
Consider, then, the job of a surgeon or physician in a country with a legal obligation to 
purchase malpractice insurance. A big data approach for the analysis of physicians’ risk could 
include, to begin with, many different sources of data directly relevant to the risk insured against, 
produced by surgeons’ and physicians’ in the course of their profession, e.g. the history of past 
interventions and diagnostic decisions that turned out to be correct or less so. It could also include 
many other sources of information. Let us imagine, for argument’s sake, a world in which insurers 
access – with the consent of their clients – data produced by surgeons’ cars (e.g. concerning their 
driving style), by social networks (e.g. to measure the frequency of swear words or harsh comments 
on one’s friends’ posts), from their credit cards and bank accounts (e.g. to measure how punctually 
a person pays her bills), academic scores for each year of school and university, data collected from 
online education platforms (including response speed during test taking and rate of correct vs. 
incorrect answers), and, finally, measurements by sensors of the Internet of Thing placed in 
hospitals, in the places where surgeons and physicians routinely move. All these data could 
theoretically contribute to a more accurate assessment of the behavioral and psychological traits of 
physicians, e.g. reliance on intuition vs. reflection, swiftness of judgment, accuracy, care for details, 
sensitivity to the needs of others, etc.. All this could contribute to a more accurate assessment of 
the risk insured against. Suppose that insurance against malpractice is compulsory and companies 
deny insurance to all physicians with a risk score higher than a certain threshold. Or perhaps, above 
such threshold, they charge a premium that is out reach for young physicians (except perhaps those 
who have families to support them). A sizeable proportion of surgeons or physicians that obtains an 
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unfavorable risk assessment (before ever exercising their profession) may be excluded from the 
profession.  
Such practice may even turn out to be socially acceptable, because it would be perceived to 
promote patient safety, even though the statistical models used will be imperfect, like all statistical 
models are in reality. For example, suppose that insurance becomes quite high, and thus 
unaffordable for the group with a risk score above 0.7. (The meaning of a 0.7 risk score is, let us 
suppose, that 70% of the physicians with features found in that group are sued at least once in their 
career for malpractice.) Physicians or surgeons with high, or at least stable, income may be able to 
afford high premiums, as well as younger physicians from wealthy families that are willing to support 
them. Yet it may be possible that a group of young graduates fresh from medical school will be 
unable to bear such expense. It is also worth noting that 3 physicians every 10 who are singled out 
as high risk will be false-positives, i.e. people who in fact will never be sued for malpractice. Social 
exclusion concerns them too.  
Notice that we provide this argument without any proof that the market equilibrium 
following from the increased availability of information will have exactly such effects on insurance 
prices. We only aim here to highlight that, as far as we know, this is a possibility that cannot be 
excluded on purely a-priori grounds. The point again is not whether physicians deserve or not to be 
excluded from their job. It is to bring attention to the fact that some individuals would be excluded 
– made disabled – by their data, even before they are given a chance to prove and exercise their 
skills.  
Our second example concerns social inclusion, which is related to the transportation of 
workers. Suppose that liability insurance, more specifically the insurance against road liability that 
is obligatory in most countries for all drivers, will be based on sophisticated risk assessment models 
based on big data. Such insurance products, let us suppose, can predict the risk level of prospective 
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drivers based on data produced by, for example, social media (Aki 2018), email use, credit card 
purchases, etc., with high accuracy. Let us suppose for argument’s sake that these data are 
demonstrably relevant to assessing risk, which provides a legal basis for collecting them. Now 
suppose that some prospective drivers are identified as the potentially very high risk (e.g. the worse 
centile in a normal risk distribution) and their insurance prices will be significantly above average. 
Not only they will be above the average for the insured population, but also significantly above the 
average premium (already quite high) nowadays paid by drivers who are young, inexperienced, (and 
male, in countries where gender discrimination in insurance is allowed), purchasing insurance for 
the first time. Suppose that we are dealing with a society without adequate public transportation 
means: some people need to use their car in order to get to work. These people would be excluded 
from their job – they would become the new disabled.  
It may be objected that very distracted or impulsive drivers are already penalized given the 
existing arrangement in which prices are the highest for large group of clients, for example, young 
and inexperienced drivers. In response: in the current practice, drivers start with the highest 
premiums in the absence of driving history but it is difficult to identify the extreme end of the risk 
distribution. But temperamentally bad drivers have at least a chance to learn to drive carefully and 
improve their risk scores, compared to baseline predictions. In the big data scenario imagined here, 
big data allow to identify very high-risk drivers before they accumulate a substantial driving history. 
High-risk drivers may end up paying a significantly higher price compared to that young and 
inexperienced (male) drivers pay today on average.  
In a way, this is simply consequence of distributing the burden of risk coverage more 
accurately, assuming constant costs for insuring the entire pool. The fact that some high-risk clients 
will pay higher premiums than they do today, even compared to the high premiums paid by young 
male inexperienced drivers, is simply the other side of the coin of the advantages of using big data 
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that are often presented as the reason to introduce these methods.  It is often alleged that 
predictions based on big data have the potential to identify low risk clients that are incorrectly priced 
as high risk because they are young and inexperienced (and males, in jurisdictions in which gender 
information can be used for insurance purposes) (Marabelli et al. 2017). If that is true, assuming 
that the introduction of the new models does not affect the overall cost of insuring the pool,3 it 
follows that the price reduction for young inexperienced drivers who are actually low risk, and will 
be paying less, will be compensated by a rise in the premiums of young inexperienced drivers who 
are actually high risk. In other words, the current, highly imperfect method for measuring the risk 
profile of young and inexperienced drivers is equivalent to implicit cross-subsidy from the actual 
low-risk to the benefit of the actual high-risk. The betterment of prediction methods allows a pricing 
that more accurately reflects the individual risk of individuals who are, now, considered uniformly 
high risk (e.g. based solely on age and driving history). But the more actuarially accurate pricing 
scheme may lead insurance premiums to levels that many high-risk drivers are unable to pay, if 
unsubsidized by others.    
We argue that this is not only a concern of individual responsibility but also one of social 
morality. Or at least it is so when driving insurance is essential to reaching the workplace, and being 
singled out as a high-risk customer for liability insurance excludes individuals who need to be able 
to drive, from a wide range of possible jobs. The people predicted to be very high risk at the wheel 
may become the new disabled in such society.           
In conclusion, the risk is that through predictions based on big data we end up being a society 
in which certain categories of people are excluded from cooperation – they become the new 
disabled. The morality of inclusion entails that we have pro tanto ethical reasons to avoid a society 
                                                        
3 That may not be the case if feedback systems based on big data also reduce the overall cost of insuring the pool. If 
the cost-reduction is significant, it may be possible to lower premiums for the low risk without raising premiums for 
the high risk. We consider here a scenario in which the overall cost of insuring the pool does not change drastically. 
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such as this – where the reasons being pro tanto stands for their being reasons that need to be 
balanced against reasons (e.g. of efficiency, or safety) to arrive at a reasonable compromise.  
 
3. Talent analytics 
 
Let us now consider the second case study, that of talent analytics. By talent (or people) analytics 
one means the use of measurements and data, as opposed to common sense, general scientific 
considerations disconnected from actual data about individuals, and gut instinct, to ensure 
productivity, engagement and retention of high talent (Davenport, Harris, and Shapiro 2010, 2). 
Examples of people analytics are (Davenport, Harris, and Shapiro 2010): 
 
• calculating the optimal number of staff members to deal with customers on the front desk; 
• choosing the right kind of personality profile to deal with customers on the front desk; 
• assessing the impact of health and wellness industry programs; 
• measuring the ability to take initiative and using it to predict performance; 
• using data when deciding personalized health and fitness programs for athletes, or for 
contract decisions. In the latter case, sport teams may try to predict risks inherent in hiring 
a promising athlete, who may become inactive due to accidents and other diseases; 
• analyzing the flow of information between team members to improve communication and 
problem solving by groups; 
• analyzing employee satisfaction through surveys; 
• collecting and analyzing key performance data, to assess personal achievements and 
alignment with  the company’s objectives; 
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• analyzing turnover and business opportunity to predict shortages or excesses of human 
capabilities before they happen; 
• developing indicators that predict how likely employees are to stay with the company, by 
identifying what employees value the most; 
• optimizing a store’s next day work schedule, based on predicted individual sales 
performance combined with other supply chain decisions. 
 
People analytics is used by many large companies. For example, Harrah’s (a hotel and casino chain) 
people analytics “observe and record the frequency with which customer-facing staff member 
smile, because that behavior is highly correlated with customer satisfaction” (Davenport, Harris, and 
Shapiro 2010, 5). Supporters of this practice argue forcefully that managers should be persuaded to 
adopt analytical decision making (Davenport, Harris, and Shapiro 2010). For example: 
 
In late 2009 Harrah’s began recruiting an external sales force and used 
organizational psychologists to create a predictive assessment for the job. But 
during the interview process managers became emotionally attached to some of 
the candidates with low probabilities of success. The analysts were prepared: They 
used randomized testing to prove that analytics was the superior method, and 
relied on their interpersonal skills to sway decisions when necessary (Davenport, 
Harris, and Shapiro 2010, 6).  
 
Here again notice that the goal of talent analytics appears fully legitimate in a business oriented and 
free market society. Who, as a customer, does not wish to be dealt by a more cheerful and polite 
front-desk employee? Who doesn’t wish to do business with companies offering competitive prices 
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and yet constantly deploying a sufficient workforce to adequately respond to customer demand at 
all time? The idea that the most competent employees should be more likely to be hired and 
retained, especially at times of economic downturns when some layoffs are unavoidable, resonates 
with widespread ideas of meritocracy. 
 However, a significant downside of people analytics is that it may create a new form of social 
exclusion. This prospect becomes more problematic the greater the amount of data available about 
individuals and the more accurate and personalized predictions become. Imagine a world in which 
education produces many more data than it does today, e.g. because massive open online courses 
(MOOC) become more accepted as educational credentials, or because pedagogic innovation, such 
as the inverted classroom, include interactions with online teaching tools, producing huge amount 
of behavioral data about all pupils. Moreover, data from education can be aggregated together with 
data from other sources, such as social media, financial behavior (e.g. how punctually one pays one’s 
bills) etc. Let us consider the objection that this would encounter a strong opposition from the data 
subject, which could be exercised through the tools afforded to individuals by the existing privacy 
legislation. But the right to privacy – understood the right to control information about oneself – 
could be formally respected because data may be collected with the consent of the data subjects, 
in a setting in which prospective employees have full control over the information they share and 
are fully aware of their predictive purposes. It is not entirely implausible to imagine that many 
people would consent to information from various sourced being used in a people analytics setting 
in a competitive setting. Some people may think that their personality, as reflected in the data, 
confers them a competitive advantage in the job market. Cognitive biases and a positive self-image 
may lead individuals to imagine a positive outcome of such data driven evaluations, as opposed to 
appropriately weighting the risk of being rated negatively. We know from experimental evidence 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3327281 
that people have a misguided, excessively optimistic perception of where they stand in the 
distribution of positive traits (Alicke et al. 1995; Kruger and Dunning 1999).   
Imagine a scenario in which employers can select the employees that are statistically more 
likely to be extrovert, agreeable, open, conscientious and confident,4 with specific emphasis on 
specific traits depending on the features of the job in question. They would also be able to exclude 
those whom they legitimately expect to be less productive than competitors or to be more 
problematic in ways that are relevant to organizations (e.g. in terms of their social skills and 
acceptance of workplace diversity). Suppose, now, that the predictive models developed by 
employers are able to identify the least suitable employees with enough accuracy during probation 
time or even during the selection process, e.g. as they would have access to the social network 
profiles of the candidates short listed for a role. This would minimize the expected costs for the 
company of making the wrong hire. 
It is far from obvious that such practices would face strong social opposition. Anyway, this is 
a philosophical essay where social opposition should not be taken at face value but questioned in 
terms of the validity of its moral premises. Considering the hiring practice in itself, that is, in isolation 
from its broader societal implications, it is understandable that employers should use all the tools 
at their disposal in order to screen the best candidates. Moreover, the demand by customers to 
receive better services aligns with social utility and the selection of suitable candidates for that 
purpose with meritocratic ideas.  
One argument against such practices derives from the morality of inclusion. The risk once 
again is that we move from the existing society which is able to accommodate even low-efficiency 
and disagreeable persons into its dominant scheme of cooperation, at least temporarily. This occurs 
                                                        
4 These correspond to the so-called ‘big five’ factors of personality psychology, with ‘confidence’ considered as the 
quality at the opposite end of the spectrum relative to the ‘neuroticism’ factor. Michal Kosinsky and others have 
shown that personality profiles based on the analysis of Facebook Likes have higher internal and external validity than 
those by humans (Youyou, Kosinski, and Stillwell 2015)  
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also thanks to a natural veil of ignorance that makes it difficult for employers to identify, and avoid, 
all the most problematic profiles. In other words, thanks to the current low predictive efficacy, the 
economic and social burden of interacting with low performers and cooperators with problematic 
psychological traits is shared between different organizations, that hire and discard such workers 
without the ability to collect the data necessary to identify and avoid them once and for all.  
Even in societies with market friendly labor laws, where it is relatively simple to dismiss 
workers, and especially the worst workers are in fact dismissed more often than others, it may take 
time before a publicly accessible track record of some workers being less suitable than most others, 
showing that a given individual is a high-risk hire and not the best choice even for a humble and low 
salary job. But the most interesting difference brought about by big data may involve hiring itself. 
Suppose that societies with very strict labor laws, making dismissals extremely difficult legally, will 
not protect the high-risk workers from the use of big data analytics before they are hired as 
employees. In such context, the harder it is to dismiss an underperforming worker, the higher the 
degree of caution exercised in hiring – the degree of risk an employer will be willing to accept.  
A possible consequence is that individuals with traits that are undesirable for a wide range 
of jobs will be permanently excluded from employment, especially in a context of generally high 
unemployment. Persons with personality traits such as a disposition to exert low effort, bad 
temperament, or prejudices may even be excluded from every job, including low-skill jobs, 
apprenticeships or early career jobs necessary to acquire a minimal level of skill necessary for any 
job. Of course, whether this scenario realizes or not, depends also on the overall level of 
unemployment, which in turn is affected by both macro-economic factors and the capacity of 
technology (in particular so-called AI) to cheaply replace certain skills of workers, increasing the 
demand and market value of other skills, that not all workers may currently possess (Autor 2015). It 
also depends on the distribution of the traits in question in the population: if some desired traits 
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are hard to find, employers will have to accept hiring individuals with accompanying undesired 
traits. Yet it seems hard to exclude a-priori the possibility that, at least with the high unemployment 
levels of many current economies, the people at one extreme of the distribution of undesired traits 
(according to the prediction based on their big data) may in fact be excluded from any sort of 
apprenticeships and jobs. 
If some human qualities (e.g. of personality) become increasingly predictable through big 
data, individuals with poor probabilities of having qualities required for any job may find themselves 
cut out from all job opportunities from the beginning to the end of their potential working life. This 
will be possible if predictive models based on big data enable employers to make predictions about 
traits that are valued across a large spectrum of jobs. Those lacking those general-purpose traits 
would become, one could say, the new disabled. 
 
4. Does the morality of inclusion single out a distinct moral concern? 
The ethical downsides of big data have not been entirely ignored. For example, the above-
mentioned report of the Geneva association about the implications of big data in the insurance 
domain reports mentions concerns of privacy, individualization of predictions and competition. 
Much has been written about the risk of discrimination resulting from big data, including, in the 
insurance domain, the issue higher premiums or reduced access to insurance products, particularly 
for traditionally discriminated groups (Zarsky 2014; Barocas and Selbst 2016). Notice however that 
sorting individuals into risk classes for the sake of adjusting premiums and excluding high-risk clients 
from services is a common and apparently accepted practice in the private insurance context. 
Insurance premiums determined according to adequately measured relevant risks are often 
described as ‘fair’ (more precisely, actuarially fair). The principles of actuarial fairness find 
widespread acceptance in societies where markets play a substantial role in allocating resources, as 
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shown by current laws and policies concerning such markets, at least for insurance that does not 
cover services connected with basic needs and human rights, that is to say for most insurance 
markets excluding health insurance affecting access to essential levels of health care (Meyer 2004, 
31). Certainly, some indirect discrimination effects, for example zoning (also called redlining) are 
considered controversial in some societies. For example, selling more expensive insurance products 
to residents in neighborhoods where there is a higher prevalence of persons from ethnic minorities 
is widely considered unjustly discriminatory in the United States (Barocas and Selbst 2015; Zarsky 
2014).  
Notice, however, that not all forms of discrimination based on big data may be strongly be 
correlated with ethnic minority status, gender or race. Moreover, as legal scholar Tal Zarsky points 
out in analyzing indirect discrimination, it is unclear that many of the ethical reasons that make 
indirect discrimination problematic apply to the insurance case across all domains (Zarsky 2014, 
1400). The traditional problem of indirect discrimination, moreover, concerns socially salient groups 
(Lippert-Rasmussen 2007), where by definition a group is socially salient “if perceived membership 
of it is important to the structure of social interactions across a wide range of social contexts” 
(Lippert-Rasmussen 2007, 386). Not all discriminating profiles based on big data will be associated 
with membership to a group that is socially salient, such as race, gender, ethnicity or age. Still, some 
big data methods that are not associated with socially salient groups may identify high-risk 
individuals and exclude them from cooperation, in ways that are permanent or almost so. 
The real novelty of predictions based on big data could be the increase of finer-grain 
discrimination between different sub-types of members of the socially salient groups that have been 
traditionally discriminated against. For example, in civil liability insurance for road accidents it may 
be possible to better distinguish males who are actually expensive to insure vs. males who are 
actually inexpensive to insure. More fine-grained and personalized statistical proxies of risk, based 
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on behavioral data, may even replace traditional social categories (e.g. young and old) still used in 
order to discriminate (fairly, in the actuarial meaning of ‘fair’). Similar considerations may be 
applicable to the domain of employment, where the use of statistical predictions may be perceived 
as providing a fairer way to allocate the chance of being unemployed, compared to current 
practices. 
Since it is not obvious that predictive algorithms will be discriminatory in the current sense, 
it is important to stress the concern of the morality of inclusion differs from moral objections that 
derive from the principle of non-discrimination. It also differs with the moral concern fairness in a 
broader sense, often defined as the concern that individuals should not be penalized due to factors 
for which they cannot be considered responsible (Avraham, Logue, and Schwarcz 2014; Dworkin 
1981; Cohen 1989). Some of the statistical proxies that may lead to exclusion from social 
cooperation – due to their impact on insurance or employment risk assessment – may be behavioral 
profiles based on behaviors that high-risk individuals can control and for which they can be 
considered responsible.  
 
5. Political morality and policy implications 
  
The morality of inclusion is not (yet?) widely accepted as a source of normative requirements, unlike 
more publicly recognized aspects of social morality, such as the moral duty to meet urgent needs 
(Scanlon 1975), the requirement to avoid discrimination and be fair. The paradigmatic case Allen 
Buchanan uses to illustrate the attraction of a morality of inclusion concerns mild physical and 
mental disabilities. Unlike the disability case, the people at risk of social cooperation by virtue of 
predictions that can be made about them may often be categorized as lacking those qualities. This 
may include moral virtues, which most citizens find reasonable to demand of workers with whom 
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they interact. Supporters of meritocracy may even welcome big data approaches that distribute 
chances of unemployment in a less random fashion compared to current affected by arbitrary 
intuitive human assessments. It is also not so clear how strong solidarity can be felt towards 
categories of people who do not appear to be disabled, mildly or severely, in the medically 
established sense. These people may be considered to be, on account of their ‘flaws’ less ‘deserving’ 
of obtaining the ‘privilege’ to have a job, especially in high unemployment contexts in which the 
very fact of obtaining a job may be considered a privilege.  
Thus, the moral idea of a morality of inclusion single out a specific aspect making the 
adoption of such technologies problematic, independent from their impact on fairness, 
discrimination, or meeting basic needs. Arguments that rely on a duty to include would stress the 
responsibility of persons responsible for development and adoption of such technologies to avoid a 
historical juncture in which certain minorities of people are identified as carriers of undesirable traits 
and, on account of those traits, be excluded from cooperation altogether. This is a distinct type of 
interest, compared to extreme deprivation and unfair discrimination. The problem of deprivation 
associated with unemployment can arguably be dealt with by providing an income sufficient to meet 
the most urgent basic needs, such as adequate nourishment, shelter, etc. The specific interest in 
social inclusion in productive cooperation, that is in question here, needs to be clearly singled as 
such, because many forms of welfare that may be designed to cope with the transformation led by 
big data and analytics could fail to address it, if it only targets severe deprivation. It is important to 
emphasize that the interest of a person which is in question is that in joining “the most productive 
and rewarding form of interaction in which he or she can participate effectively” (Buchanan 1996, 
42) and this is arguably not even approximated by providing individuals with income unrelated to 
the performance of a job and to the reasonable expectation of obtaining one in the future.   
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As Allen Buchanan acknowledged ( Buchanan 1996), there may be situations in which it is 
not reasonable to meet each citizen’s interest of inclusion fully. Nowadays, where many simple tasks 
are performed by machines and many complex tasks require sophisticated cognitive capacities, it is 
arguably more difficult for the mildly cognitively disabled to find a role qua cooperators, yet few 
would endorse a transition to a society in which cognitive skills were less important than they are 
today, at the cost of a significant worsening the average standard of living. Still, as Buchanan 
observes, the interest of inclusion is legitimate at least pro tanto and decent societies should try to 
balance it with other reasonable moral demands.  
Notice, however, that the condition of the new disabled in the big data world - the people 
unable to work because of unfavorable predictions made about them - may be even worse than 
that of people who are disabled in the traditional sense, e.g. due to biological physical or mental 
impairments. For unlike the latter, the subjects of unfavorable predictions are not considered 
physically or mentally impaired. Thus, they may not elicit solidarity from would be cooperators.  
Maybe for efficient and socially adequate workers it is easier to sympathize with persons with 
recognized disabilities, than with apparently healthy workers lacking some important socially 
desirable traits. Moreover, the lack of certain psychological and moral qualities in employees, e.g. 
kindness, sociability, or openness towards diversity, may negatively affect the work environment 
generating hatred towards the workers lacking those qualities. This is one more reason to expect 
that measures to promote the inclusion of the ‘new disabled’ are not likely to receive widespread 
support in society.  
 Yet we believe that a persuasive case could be made for considering this outcome as morally 
unsatisfactory. The challenge is to identify a policy that could achieve this in a socially acceptable 
way. Let us consider people analytics, first. The most traditional policy for protecting workers, 
namely a prohibition to lay off people, may actually backfire, in so far as it will raise the value for 
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employers to have predictions and reduce even further their propensity to hire a person without 
favorable predictions. Another possible policy would be to ‘artificially’ boost the rate of economic 
growth, e.g. through state expenditure or tax cuts, so as to stimulate employment. The expectation 
would be that as the unemployment rate goes down, employers cannot afford to be too choosy and 
will eventually hire also individuals with unfavorable predictions. One difficulty with such solution 
is that boosting growth with macro-economic policy comes at a cost, e.g. society may have to spend 
more to pay interests on debt and this, especially for debt-ridden states, may be a considerable cost 
that society reasonably wants to avoid. This leaves two policy options on the table: first, to prohibit 
the use of people analytics both in decisions concerning whom to lay off and whom to hire; second, 
the state as employer of last resort.  
First, let us consider the prohibition. One may restrict the use of big data predictions to 
formative contexts (i.e., training of people) rather that selection contexts (i.e., employment 
decisions). This argument relies on three premises: First, many of the negative personality traits that 
may be unfavorable in certain work conditions are not static and deterministic. For example, people 
are able to improve social deficits or to develop coping strategies when those deficits become 
integrated in training programs. For example, in medicine, teaching medical students increasingly 
includes training of social competences such as empathic concern (Katsarov et al., in preparation). 
Second, there is good evidence to assume that predictors of complex personality traits will have 
limits in their explanatory power, even when they rely on big data. Decades of experiences in test 
psychology have shown the difficulty to make psychometric measurements ecologically valid; i.e. 
there is reason to believe that also big data predictions will be to a significant degree unreliable. In 
a formative context, it will be much easier to cope with those types of imprecision compared to 
using them for job selection. Third, at least some of the character traits that may be used for 
selection decisions are constitutive for the self-understanding of individuals and traits from which it 
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is not reasonable to expect individuals to dissociate themselves from. For example, limited empathic 
concern – although negative in various job settings – may be part of a personality that overall 
performs well. The film character “Dr. House” may serve as an example here – an extremely asocial 
physician (who for sure would be sorted out by any “big data sociality detector”) who nevertheless 
saved many patients. Thus, there is normative reason that speaks against the homogeneity that the 
selective use of big data predictions may generate. Nevertheless, formative use in training and 
continuous education allows to deal with imprecision and “special cases”, making a restriction to 
this context plausible. 
The second possibility would be the state as an employer of last resort. For example, local 
communities could use part of their funds (from taxpayer money) in order to hire people who in a 
people analytics context are rejected by all private companies. The policy comes at a cost because, 
like the former solution, it is certainly going to have an efficiency cost. If the goal of local 
communities is delivering services to the public, then it would be just as rational for public and 
private employers alike to avoid hiring individuals predicted to be less suitable for the relevant tasks, 
compared to workers selected using big data. However, one of the goals of such public organizations 
would be to promote the inclusion of these individuals. Relative to this goal, the policy in question 
will not be irrational.  
A third possibility could be a combination of the former two. One may further imagine 
employment by the state that, beside inclusion, serves educational and research purposes as well. 
Educational purposes may include ways for enhancing the missing skills. It may still be possible to 
address the shortcomings of persons with unfavorable predictions combining work and training 
within employment by the state. Research purposes may be included also in order to produce data 
about what features are more malleable can be effectively modified, as a way of redressing non-
employability determined by unfavorable predictions. Society has a long-term interest in 
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understanding which environmental measures can offset or at least mitigate the problem. The long-
term interest in question is, again, not just economic efficiency but being a morally decent society 
that fulfills the obligations of the morality of inclusion.  
Let us now turn to the insurance case. This appears to be slightly more manageable than the 
one concerning employment. Consider for example the case of compulsory insurance for medical 
malpractice. Here society may respond to the problem, by abolishing compulsory insurance against 
malpractice. Instead, the victims of medical malpractice could be compensated through a fund 
subsidized by taxpayers (or by the users of medical services, to achieve some kind of 
proportionality). For transportation, the insurance costs of drivers who are uninsurable by free 
markets could be subsidized by taxpayers. Eligibility for such subsidy may also be combined with a 
requirement to go through additional training, to acquire risk-minimizing strategies. Or public 
services could be made more efficient and capillary, making driving a personal car less of a necessity 




In this paper we have identified and described a dimension of the moral assessment of big data 
technologies. We have argued that it is conceptually independent from the moral obligation to avoid 
discrimination, unfairness, and severe deprivation. This concern is the morality of inclusion, that 
reflects the interest, of every individual, of participating in “the most productive and rewarding form 
of interaction in which he or she can participate effectively” ” (Buchanan 1996, 42). From the point 
of view of the morality of inclusion, big data may be problematic because it enables more accurate 
predictions about individuals. This then can lead to their exclusion from cooperation.  
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We have indicated two mechanisms through which this may happen: first, individuals may 
be excluded from insurance products that are necessary to gain access to certain job opportunities; 
second, individuals may be excluded from all or most jobs by virtue of predictions made about their 
future productivity and their social attitudes and skills. We have explained the nature of the 
problem, illustrated the differences with discrimination and fairness issues, and argued that 
protection for the interest in question may be an unpopular political cause.  
Since the morality of inclusion stands for an authentic interest of individuals, societies should 
take reasonable measures to mitigate the problem of big-data driven exclusion. In the final section 
of the paper we discuss four possible political strategies for people analytics: strengthening labor 
law in the direction of making workers dismissal more difficult, reduction of unemployment through 
macro-economic policy, prohibition of the use of people analytics in hiring and dismissing decisions, 
and the state as employer of last resort, which combines employment with training, education and 
research. We argue that the first can be counterproductive, the second may not be economically 
sustainable in many cases, and this gives societies reason to seriously consider the other two. For 
big data predictions in the insurance sectors there seems to be three equally reasonable strategies, 
namely, the abolition of compulsory insurance that causes the exclusion of some workers (where 
the state takes charge for compensating the victims), subsidizing policies for high-risk individuals, 
and adopting structural changes that reduce the dependency of workers on private insurance 
products that are essential for social inclusion.  
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